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Abstract
This policy brief examines the public 
water infrastructure in Basra Governorate, 
southern Iraq. Crucial to the delivery of 
water services to the population, the long-
term deterioration of this infrastructure is 
a result of armed conflict, international 
sanctions and defective governance. 
Water infrastructure upgrading was a pri-
ority for state-rebuilding after the 2003 
invasion but receded under the civil 
war. Governmental and donor plans for 
mega infrastructure water projects have 
stalled in the face of systemic corrup-
tion. Compact water treatment units are 
the dominant treatment technology, sup-
plying 83 percent of treatment capacity 
across Basra Governorate and 92 percent 
in Basra city. The efficiency of water 
treatment plants supplying Basra city is 
restricted by the high salt content of water 
from the Shatt al-Arab and irregular flows 
from the Bada‘a Canal. Supply flows are 
impacted by upstream dam construction, 
climatic variability, pollution and illegal 
water tapping. In the face of high popu-
lation growth in southern Iraq, there is 
a pressing policy need to diversify water 
sources for Basra and improve the effi-
ciencies of treatment technologies and 
distribution networks.
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Executive Summary
In July 2018 massive protests erupted in Basra city as residents demanded improvements 
in public services. Failings in water management were at the heart of local grievances: an 
outbreak of water-related illnesses was triggered by the increased use of polluted water 
from the Shatt al-Arab, Basra’s traditional source of water. However, the deterioration of 
public water infrastructure has its roots in decades of armed conflict and international 
sanctions. Tap water has been undrinkable since the 1990s, forcing most households 
to rely on private water vendors. Water infrastructure upgrading was a priority for state 
rebuilding after 2003 but receded under the sectarian civil war. Governmental and donor 
plans for mega infrastructure water projects have stalled in the face of systemic corruption 
and racketeering. Compact water treatment units (CWTUs) are the dominant purification 
technology, supplying 83 percent of treatment capacity across Basra Governorate and 92% 
in Basra city. The efficiency of CWTUs supplying Basra city is reduced by irregular flows 
from the Bada‘a Canal to the key conduit of the R-Zero water treatment plant. These flows 
are impacted by upstream dam construction, climatic variability and illegal water tapping. 
The operational capacity of CWTUs is also limited by underinvestment in their mainte-
nance, often reducing their working life to 10–15 years. There is a pressing policy need to 
diversify water sources for Basra and improve the efficiencies of treatment technologies 
and distribution networks.
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Executive Summary
في يوليو/تموز عام 2018، إندلعت تظاهرات كبيرة في مدينة البصرة )جنوب العراق( للمطالبة بتحسين الخدمات العامة. اإلخفاق في 
إدارة المياه كان في صميم الشكاوى المحلية: تفشي األمراض المرتبطة بالمياه بسبب استخدام المياه الملوثة من شط العرب، مصدرالمياه 
التقليدي في البصرة. ومع ذلك فإن تدهور البنية التحتية العامة للمياه ترجع جذوره إلى عقود من النزاعات والعقوبات الدوليّة. لم تعد مياه 
الصنبور صالحة للشرب منذ تسعينيات القران الماضي، مما أجبر الناس على االعتماد على بائعي المياه من القطاع الخاص. تحسين البنية 
التحتية للمياه كان من بين أولويات إعادة بناء الدولة بعد عام 2003، ولكنه تراجع بعد الحرب األهلية الطائفية. توقفت خطط الحكومة 
والجهات المانحة لمشاريع المياه ذات البنى التحتية الضخمة في ظل مواجهة الفساد واالبتزاز المالي. ال تزال وحدات معالجة المياه 
المدمجة )CWTUs( التقنية السائدة لتنقية المياه، وتوفر %83 من سعة معالجة المياه في محافظة البصرة و%92 في مركز المحافظة. 
إن كفاءة وحدات معالجة المياه المدمجة التي تزود مدينة البصرة مقيدة بالتدفقات غير المنتظمة من قناة البدعة إلى األنبوب الرئيسي 
لمحطة معالجة المياه R-Zero. وتتأثر هذه التدفقات ببناء السدود عند المنبع وبتقلبات المناخ وباستغالل المياه غير المشروع. تتقيد 
القدرة التشغيلية لوحدات معالجة المياه نتيجة نقص االستثمار في صيانتها، وغالباً ما يؤدي ذلك إلى انخفاض العمر التشغيلي للوحدات من 
15-10عاماً. هناك حاجة ُملحة إليجاد سياسة من أجل إيجاد مصادر متنوعة للمياه في البصرة وتحسين كفاءات تقنية المعالجة وشبكات 
توزيع المياه.
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Recommendations for Improving Basra’s Public Water Supply
Regional Level
1. Diversify primary sources of public water. A sustainable public water infrastructure in 
Basra Governorate requires the diversification of water supply sources to create sys-
tem-wide robustness against negative long-term trends in surface water availability 
(e.g. from upstream damming and projected climate change impacts) and disrup-
tive short-term events (e.g. pumping failures or flooding). Construction of a planned 
desalination plant at Al Faw would create a major supply asset in the regional public 
water infrastructure, but this could also generate a single-source dependency without 
investments in the wider network of water supply and treatment. These additional 
measures include timely completion of the donor-funded Great Basra Water Project, 
increased storage (back-up) capacity of the Badaʿa Canal and upgrades in the opera-
tional efficiencies of compact water treatment units (CWTUs)—the major purification 
technology in the governorate (see Section 3 and Section 4).
2. Improve the operational performance of water distribution networks. The 240-kilometre 
Badaʿa Canal is a key artery supplying water to treatment plants in and around Basra 
city. However, the open character of the canal leads to major flow reductions as a result 
of evaporation, illegal tapping and the uncontrolled growth of aquatic plants. The 
project to convert the Badaʿa Canal to a closed pipeline, announced in 2020 by the 
Government of Iraq, represents an essential improvement to the public water supply 
infrastructure. While piped distribution to households has high spatial coverage in Basra 
city (reaching 95 percent of the population of 1.38 million), most of the network is over 
50 years old and poorly maintained. Upgrades should be informed by a system-wide risk 
assessment (see Section 2 and Section 4).
3. Increase use of wastewater recycling for industrial, agricultural and household use. 
In Basra’s large oil fields, the extensive use of water injection for oil extraction 
is unsustainable and highly polluting: there is scope for far greater use of water 
recycling. Biological treatment of sewage wastewater has significant potential for 
supporting agriculture in the water-stressed horticultural areas. Other ecological 
treatment technologies can recycle wastewater for domestic as well as agricultural 
purposes, contributing also to the long-term restoration and sustainable manage-
ment of marshland environments (see Section 4).
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National Level
4. Conduct an independent review of water governance in Basra Governorate. There is exten-
sive illegal extraction from public water networks, which increases operation and 
maintenance costs and reduces water pressure. Largely unchecked, this illegal tapping 
extends from individual households to businesses and large horticultural enterprises: 
it compounds risks to public health from water contamination. There are also multiple 
allegations of corruption and racketeering associated with water project investments 
and the maintenance of public water infrastructure. An independent review of public 
water management in Basra Governorate is needed to determine key challenges and 
to offer governance recommendations on the basis of inclusive dialogue with affected 
communities (see Section 2 and Section 4).
Figure 1: Illegal water tapping, Yaseen Khuraibet district in Basra city
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
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1. Introduction: The Water Crisis in Basra Governorate 
In July 2018 massive protests erupted in Basra city as residents demanded improvements 
in public services. Throughout the summer, protestors clashed with security forces and 
armed militia groups, who killed at least 15 protestors and injured 190. The victims were 
named ‘water martyrs’ (shuhada’ almiah) as failings in water management were at the heart 
of local grievances. An outbreak of water-related illnesses was triggered by the increased 
use of polluted water from the Shatt al-Arab to offset reduced flows from the Badaʿa 
Canal. By November 2018, approximately 118,000 people had attended the city’s hospi-
tals suffering from serious gastrointestinal complaints. Public health experts attributed 
these symptoms to poor water quality.1 The Shatt al-Arab supplies 60 percent of the water 
treated in Basra Governorate, with the rest supplied by cleaner flows from the Badaʿa 
Canal. During supply emergencies, extra water is extracted from the Shatt al-Arab as part 
of a rationing system (marashanah) that compensates for shortfalls from the Canal.2 
The Shatt al-Arab is the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, yet its flows have 
dropped considerably since the 1970s because of upstream dam construction in Turkey, 
Iran and Syria. Reduced freshwater outflow from the Shatt al-Arab into the Persian Gulf is 
a major contributor to the growing salinisation of the river (heightened in the summer). It 
is also heavily contaminated by untreated sewage, industrial waste, oil spills and irrigation 
return flows.3 Public water withdrawals from the Shatt al-Arab for household use in Basra 
are directly linked to unsafe water quality levels recorded in 2018.
However, the deterioration of public water supplies in Basra Governorate has its roots in 
decades of armed conflict, underinvestment and dysfunctional governance.4 Tap water 
has been undrinkable since the 1990s forcing households to buy from private water 
vendors. Water infrastructure upgrading was a priority for state rebuilding after 2003 but 
Iraqi government efforts receded under the sectarian civil war (2006–2008) and war with 
Daesh (2013–2017). More recently, governmental plans for large-scale water supply pro-
jects, supported by international donors, have stalled in the face of bureaucratic delays 
and systemic corruption. This policy brief focuses on events since 2018, informed by data 
supplied by the Basra Water Directorate and 13 local interviews — conducted in August 
1   ‘Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis’, Human Rights Watch (2019), p.1. Available 
at https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/22/basra-thirsty/iraqs-failure-manage-water-crisis (accessed 15 
February 2021).
2   Hassan Khleel H. Al-Mahmod, ‘Water Resources in Basra and its Recent Problems’ [almwaryd almiyah 
fī albasra wa mushkilatuha alem’easerh], Marine Sciences Centre, University of Basra (Basra, 2019), p. 93.
3   Ameen Kadhim, Ashton Shortridge and Ali K. Al-Nasrawi, ‘Cases and Consequences of Environ-
mental Degradation Along the Shatt Al-Arab River: A Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) 
Perspective’, GeoJournal 158 (2020), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-020-10225-0; Wim Zwi-
jnenburg, ‘Troubled Waters: Documenting Pollution of Iraq’s Shatt Al-Arab River’, Bellingcat (2020). 
Available at https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2020/11/10/troubled-waters-documenting-pollution-
of-iraqs-shatt-al-arab-river/ (accessed 11 February 2021).
4   Mark Zeitoun, Heather Elaydi, Jean-Philippe Dross, Michael Talhami, Evaristo de Pinho-Oliveira and 
Javier Cordoba, ‘Urban Warfare Ecology: A Study of Water Supply in Basrah’, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 41/6 (2017), pp. 904–25, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12546.
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2020 and October 2020–January 2021 — with water managers/engineers, environmental 
experts, civil society activists, governmental actors and religious figures. We first outline 
the current reliance of Basra’s public water network on flows from the Shatt al-Arab and 
Badaʿa Canal. Then, we address the dominant water purification technology employed in 
the governorate — compact water treatment units (CWTUs). With their modular design, 
compact units can enhance the system-wide resilience of water infrastructure, but their 
contribution is limited by the variable quality of raw water and degraded distribution net-
works which are subject also to illegal water tapping. We caution against relying on mega 
infrastructure projects, such as seawater desalination, as a one-shot solution to Basra’s 
water crisis, calling instead for a move to system-wide resilience through supply diversifica-
tion, multidirectional connectivity and effective governance.
2. A Vulnerable Water Network
Public water supply reaches 85 percent of the Basra Governorate population of 3.14 million 
and 95 percent of the city population of 1.38 million.5 Most of the transmission and dis-
tribution pipes were installed in the 1980s, with an estimated total length of 10,500 km.6 
According to the Ministry of Water Resources — which has responsibility for the supply 
of ‘raw’ water to treatment plants — the biggest issue with the ongoing water crisis is 
not the scarcity of water, but rather the existence of old and degraded water distribution 
networks, subject to extensive damage from illegal water tapping.7 However, there are 
major water supply issues in Basra Governorate arising from its downstream location in 
the Euphrates-Tigris river system. Since the 1950s, the natural flow regimes of the two 
rivers have dramatically reduced due to upstream dam development for hydropower and 
irrigation purposes.8 Water quality has also deteriorated significantly downstream because 
of large amounts of urban, industrial and agricultural waste pouring into both rivers. The 
river system feeds into the Shatt al-Arab, which also receives water from the Garmat Ali (a 
waterway fed by the al-Hammar marshes) as well as from the Karkheh and Karun Rivers 
in Iran. Iraqi drainage of the al-Hammar marshes and Iranian withdrawals from the Karun 
River greatly increase the salinity of Shatt al-Arab water  as seawater intrudes upstream.9
5   Data supplied by Basra Water Directorate, February 2021.
6   ‘Report on Data Collection Survey on Water Sector in Southern Iraq‘, JICA (2015), p. 3–6. Available at 
https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000020477.pdf (accessed 16 November 2020).
7   Interview (online) with Ministry of Water Resources representative, 4 January 2021.
8   ‘Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia’, UN-ESCWA and BGR (Beirut, Lebanon, 
2013) Available at https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/e_escwa_
sdpd_13_inventory_e.pdf (accessed 16 November 2020).
9   Ibid, p. 162; Li Dinar Abdullah, Usama F. A. Karim, Ilyas Masih, Ioana Popescu and Pieter Van der Zaag, 
‘Anthropogenic and Tidal Influences on Salinity Levels of the Shatt al-Arab River, Basra, Iraq’, International 
Journal of River Basin Management 14/3 (2016), pp. 357–66, DOI: 10.1080/15715124.2016.1193509; Khayyun 
Amtair Rahi, ‘Salinity Management in the Shatt Al-Arab River’, International Journal of Engineering & 
Technology 7/4.20 (2018), pp. 128–33, DOI: 10.14419/ijet.v7i4.20.25913.
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Figure 2: Major Waterways in Southern Iraq
Map by Mina Moshkeri
The main sources of water in Basra Governorate are the the Shatt-al Arab and the Badaʿa 
Canal (both of which receive water from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers). For Basra city and 
surrounding areas, the main artificial channel of freshwater distribution is the Badaʿa Canal 
(also known as the Sweetwater Canal). This 240-km open channel was built from 1992–1997. 
It pumps water from the Gharraf Canal and the Euphrates, feeding into the R-Zero Water 
Treatment Plant next to Basra International Airport (Figure 2). While designed to boost the 
quality of water supplied to Basra city, the construction of the Badaʿa Canal was compro-
mised by funding shortfalls caused by the UN economic sanctions regime (1990–2003). 
This resulted in an incomplete concrete lining to the canal, making the waterway prone 
to embankment failures. In 2003–4, the US funded limited structural repairs to the Badaʿa 
Canal as part of a post-invasion commitment to restore water infrastructure in southern 
Iraq.10 However, this rehabilitation was insufficient to prevent further deterioration of the 
canal, accelerated by maintenance neglect and illegal water extraction. In recent years, the 
rapid accumulation of aquatic plants in the canal, clogging up pumps and filters, has also 
disrupted expected flows.11 
10   ‘Umm Qasr Water Scheme’, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (2006), pp. 4 5. Available 
at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a533626.pdf (accessed 16 January 2021). 
11   Zainab Mehdi, ‘Political and Environmental Factors Affecting Southern Iraq’s Water Shortages’, LSE 
Middle East Centre blog, 4 September 2020. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/09/04/polit-
ical-and-environmental-factors-affecting-southern-iraqs-water-shortages/ (accessed 14 January 2021).
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The supply capacity of the Badaʿa Canal is regularly cut by flow disruptions, and this was a 
major contributor to the water crisis in summer 2018. Adoption of the marashanah ration-
ing system, involving greater extraction of heavily polluted water from the Shatt al-Arab, 
overwhelmed the purification capacity of the city’s water treatment plants. Following the 
chronic water crisis in Basra, and pressure from local politicians,  the national govern-
ment, in 2020, announced plans to convert the Badaʿa Canal into a more efficient closed 
channel system, with work due to be completed by the end of 2021. This project plans to 
double the flow rate of water delivered to Basra city, reaching 15 m3/second.12
Figure 3: Badaʿa Canal, November 2020 
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
As there is no alternative freshwater channel for Basra, the Iraqi government has moved 
to reduce the vulnerability of the water supply system with tenders for large infrastructure 
projects.13 The largest commissioned is the Great Basra Water Project, designed to improve 
water supplies to the cities of Basra and Hartha by rehabilitating and constructing water 
treatment plants and upgrading distribution networks. Funded since 2008 by development 
assistance loans from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), what was 
12   ‘Governor of Basra: We Have Agreed with the Minister of Water Resources to Expedite the Comple-
tion of the Conversion of the Badaʿa Canal into a Closed Tube Channel’, National Iraq News Agency, 
4 September 2020. Available at https://ninanews.com/Website/News/Details?Key=854247 (accessed 16 
January 2021); ‘Minister of Resources for Al-Mirbad: We Included $2 billion in the Budget to Transform 
the Badaʿa Canal into a Tube’, Al Mirbad News, 26 December 2020. Available at https://www.almirbad.
com/detail/73779 (accessed 25 May 2021).
13   Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘Basra’s Political Marketplace: Understanding Government Failure 
After the Protests’, IRIS Policy Brief (2019), pp. 3-5. Available at http://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/
files/Saleem%20and%20Skelton%20-%20Basra%27s%20Political%20Marketplace_0.pdf (accessed 14 
January 2021).
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planned as a six-year project costing US $672 million was still incomplete over ten years 
later with ballooning costs. An investigation by Human Rights Watch in 2018 noted claims 
from insiders that corruption was behind delays to the project.14 Other major investments 
in public water infrastructure have stalled as a result of alleged corruption and racketeering, 
such as a reverse osmosis desalination plant at Hartha commissioned in 2014 by the Iraqi 
government to process 200,000 m3/day of saline water from the Shatt al-Arab.15 
Repeated governance problems with major projects to scale up the production of public 
water have not dissuaded the national government from seeking a mega infrastructure 
silver bullet to solve the water crisis in Basra Governorate. In 2019, the Public Works 
Ministry awarded an Austrian company the management contract for a seawater reverse 
osmosis desalination plant at the port town of Al Faw. With a total project value of US $1.8 
billion, the desalination plant is scheduled to be completed by 2024 with a world-beat-
ing capacity of one million m3/day of ‘new water’. The water infrastructure development 
includes a 240-km transmission system supplying Basra and nine other cities in the gov-
ernorate.16 This project has also seen corruption allegations.17
3. Compact Treatment Units: The Workhorses of Basra’s Water 
Infrastructure
CWTUs are the dominant technology for water treatment in Basra Governorate, employing 
pressurised sand filters and chlorinating units to lower turbidity and sterilise water. Since 
2003, compact units have been favoured by the Iraqi government and international donors 
for, it is claimed, their operational resilience. While the treatment capacity of individual 
units is modest —traditionally 200 m3/hr rising to 400 m3/hr for modern units — compact 
water treatment is modular, allowing easier transportation, installation and, in principle, 
maintenance.18 The total design capacity of public water treatment infrastructure in Basra 
Governorate is 1.34 million m3/day, although Basra Water Directorate reports actual capacity 
at 962,631 m3/day. CWTUs supply 83 percent of actual treatment capacity across the gover-
norate and 92 percent of actual treatment capacity in Basra city.19 
14   ‘Basra is Thirsty: Iraq’s Failure to Manage the Water Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, pp. 84–5.
15   Robert Tollast, ‘Iraq and the Desalination Revolution: First Steps, Future Trends’, Iraq Energy Institute 
(2020). Available at https://iraqenergy.org/2020/05/01/iraq-and-the-desalination-revolution-first-steps-fu-
ture-trends/ (accessed 16 January 2021).
16   ‘Al Basrah Water Project’, ILF Consulting Engineers, Presentation at Basra Mega Projects Conference 
(Istanbul, Turkey, October 2019).
17   ‘Integrity Issues its Report on the Basra Water Project and Holds the Ministry of Construction Responsible 
for its Delay’, Baghdad Times, 2020, available at https://www.baghdad-times.net/2020/04/29/-النزاهة-تصدر
 accessed 30 November 2020); ‘Suspicions of Corruption Affecting the Basra) /تقريرها-عن-مشروع-ماء-البص
Water Desalination Project.. The Company Comprises of an Office and Six Employees’, Al Masalah, 9 
March 2021, available at https://almasalah.com/ar/News/206715/--شبهات-فساد-تطال-مشروع-تحلية-مياه-البصرة
.(accessed 10 March 2021) الشركة-عبارة-عن-مكتب-وستة-موظفين
18   Andrea Micangeli, Simone Grego and Stefano Esposto, ‘Sustainable Rehabilitation of Water Infra-
structures in Southern Iraq after the Second Gulf War’ in J. Kauffman and Kun Mo Lee (eds), Handbook 
of Sustainable Engineering (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 211–45.
19   Data from Basra Water Directorate, December 2020.
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There are over 300 CWTUs in use across Basra Governorate. Research for this policy 
brief selected two key water treatment plants to assess their operational performance, 
collecting water data from the Basra Water Directorate and, in October–November 2020, 
conducting interviews with water managers and engineers. The two plants chosen were: 
(a) the R-Zero plant (34 CWTUs) in Al Abbas district (Al Abbas/R-Zero water plant) 
serving Basra city; and (b) the Al Zubayr plant (or Al Shuaiba Water Treatment Complex) 
(12 CWTUs) at Al Shuaiba, 8 km south-west of Basra city, which is supplied by R-Zero 
(Figure 2). In response to the 2018 water crisis, both plants were allocated major funding 
for compact unit rehabilitation and related upgrades. In 2018, the R-Zero plant received 
UNICEF funding (from a US $6.1 million grant from the Australian Agency for Interna-
tional Development), while in 2019 Basra Governorate budgeted 983 million dinars (US 
$674,000) for contract work on the Al Zubayr plant.
(a) The R-Zero (Al Abbas) Water Treatment Plant
R-Zero has the largest concentration of CWTUs in Basra city, equipped with:
• 25 CWTUs with a design capacity of 200 m3/hr
• 6 CWTUs with a design capacity of 400 m3/hry
Figure 4: Exterior of the R Zero Water Treatment Plant, November 2020.
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
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Figure 5: Interior of the R Zero Water Treatment Plant, November 2020. 
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
The R-Zero Plant is a strategic gateway for water distribution from the Badaʿa Canal, 
receiving up to 26,000–30,000 m3/hr of water. Of this total, 5,000 m3/hr is treated by 
compact units in the R-Zero Plant for distribution by pipeline to city centre residents. The 
remaining water, after preliminary filtration, is sent to nine water treatment plants in and 
around Basra: the Al Zubayr Plant receives the largest single share (4,000–5,000 m3/hr) of 
this raw water from R-Zero.20 It is estimated that up to 40 percent of the water distributed 
by the R-Zero Plant is lost due to leakages and illegal connections.21
An immediate cause of the 2018 water crisis in Basra was a sudden drop in flow rates 
from the Badaʿa Canal: between August and October 2018, the R-Zero Plant extracted 
water instead from the Shatt al-Arab under the marashanah system. The saline and pol-
luted water overwhelmed CWTU capacity, degrading pumps and filters. At the time 
both raw and treated water from R-Zero far exceeded Iraqi water standards.22 In 2019, 
UNICEF first funded the emergency rehabilitation of six compact units at a higher water 
treatment capacity (400 m3/hr) then another ten CWTUs at the standard capacity (200 
m3/hr). New water pumps for the plant were funded by the Supreme Religious Author-
ity of Iraq, who decried governmental mismanagement of water in Basra. While these 
20   The other eight water treatment plants supplied by R-Zero are: Al Brad’ia (1,500–3,000 m3/hr), Jubaila 
(1,500–3,000 m3/hr), Basra Unified (3,000–4,500 m3/hr), Al Hartha (1,500–3,000 m3/hr), Um Qasr 
(1,000–2,000 m3/hr), Abu Al Khaseeb (1,000–2,000 m3/hr), Abraj Al Hayaniah (1,000 m3/hr) and Khor 
Al Zubayr (1,000 m3/hr).
21   ‘Minutes of Basrah WASH Coordination Group Meeting, 8 April 2019’, WASH Cluster Iraq (2019). 
Available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/docu-
ments/files/basrah_wash_cluster_meeting_minutes_8_april_2019_.pdf (accessed 16 October 2020).
22   For example, the Iraqi standard for total suspended solids (TSS) is 60 mg/l (Law No. 26/1967): in 
November 2018, the TSS levels at R-Zero were 144 mg/l for raw water and 90 mg/l for treated water. Mean 
TSS levels from 2014–19 at the plant were 81 mg/l for raw water and 27 mg/l for treated water.
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investments created greater system redundancy for future maintenance work, the water 
treatment capacity of R-Zero remained at 5,000 m3/hr, constrained by the plant’s share 
of the limited flows from the Badaʿa Canal. 
Furthermore, water treatment based on assemblies of multiple CWTUs has been inef-
ficient. Compact units can last up to 20 years, but Iraqi water engineers report that 
continuous and costly maintenance is necessary after only five years of operation. Half 
of the CWTUs at the R-Zero Plant are over 15 years old and running below their design 
capacities for water treatment. While there are no reported shortages of aluminium 
sulfate (alum) and chlorine, old compact units regularly malfunction, and there are 
often delays in securing spare parts attributed to lengthy governmental approval pro-
cesses. Given low levels of staffing, the operation and maintenance of CWTUs is very 
challenging, negatively affecting the capacity to treat water at a reliable level of quality. 
R-Zero is facing delays over the installation of a programmable logic controller system, 
which in principle would mitigate operation and maintenance constraints by digitalis-
ing real-time controls over the water treatment process. The plant also needs to replace 
its heavily corroded main water collection basins. 
(b) The Al Zubayr (Al Shuaiba) Water Treatment Plant
As noted above, the Al Zubayr plant receives 4,000–5,000 m3/hr of ‘raw water’ from R-Zero.
The plant is equipped with:
• 4 CTWUs with a design capacity of 400 m3/hr
• 8 CTWUs with a design capacity of 200 m3/hr
Figure 6: Al Zubayr Water Treatment Plant, November 2020
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Figure 7: Al Zubayr Water Treatment Plant, November 2020
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
The Al Zubayr Plant illustrates the governance paralysis that regularly affects water manage-
ment in Basra Governorate. In November 2019, the Provincial Council budgeted 983 million 
dinars (US $674,000) for essential maintenance and rehabilitation works, but for reasons 
unclear, this money was not forthcoming. No major rehabilitation work has taken place at 
the plant since UNICEF funded the rehabilitation of four CWTUs in 2008, which have since 
been taken out of service. In 2020, none of the 12 compact units were operational: this meant 
that the raw water supplied by R-Zero received at best some chlorine treatment before distri-
bution to residential areas in Al Zubayr district, yet remained undrinkable. As households in 
Basra city have long relied on private vendors for potable water, so do residents of Al Zubayr. 
A major alternative source is desalinated water sold to vendors by a petrochemical plant in 
the large Zubayr oil field (in 2008, the UK’s Department for International Development and 
UNICEF co-funded an upgrade of its water filtration equipment). In spring 2020, during a 
coronavirus wave, Al Zubayr municipality and Basra Oil Company provided free supplies of 
this desalinated water for citizens unable to access supplies.23
Rapid population growth in Al Zubayr district has outstripped the operational capacity of 
the water treatment plant at Al Shuaiba and a smaller local plant at Al Khitwa, which has 
five CWTUs treating up to 1,200 m3 (rehabilitated in 2009–2011 with funding from the UK 
Department for International Development).24 Water engineers report that the Al Shauaiba 
water treatment plant needs complete rehabilitation, including new pumps, water collec-
23   ‘A Campaign to Distribute Free Drinking Water to Citizens West of Basra’, Mawazine News, 26 March 
2020. Available at https://www.mawazin.net/Details.aspx?jimare=92079 (accessed 21 January 2021).
24   ‘Development Tracker: Az Zubayr Water Treatment Plant’, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development 
Office, 2021. Available at https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-201260 (accessed 21 January 2021).
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tion basins and additional compact units supplying at least an additional 2,000 m3/hr of 
water. There is also a need for new transmission lines both from R-Zero to Al Zubayr and 
also to the local areas supplied by Al Zubayr. However, the goal of greater water treatment 
capacity again hits the volumetric constraint of the limited and variable capacity of Badaʿa 
Canal supplies, as delivered by the R-Zero Water Treatment Plant through an old and 
unreliable distribution network. The short-term priority for the Al Zubayr plant is to acti-
vate at least some of its dormant CWTUs: given humanitarian concerns over a failing local 
network for public water treatment, the United Nations Development Programme agreed 
to fund the rehabilitation of four compact units in 2021.
Improving the Performance of CWTUs
The production of safe, clean water by water treatment plants is dependent on the oper-
ational performance of compact units in treating the raw water supplied. Treatment of 
Badaʿa Canal raw water has tended to result in satisfactory water quality for the R-Zero 
and Al Zubayr CWTU plants, but the sourcing of saline and polluted raw water from the 
Shatt al-Arab is mainly responsible for the failure of water treatment plants in Basra city 
(both conventional and CWTU) to produce adequate drinking water.25 Without being 
able to address this raw water quality, the focus has been on plant-specific conditions of 
operation. Post-2003 humanitarian assessments of CWTU plants in southern Iraq recom-
mended improving their operational resilience by maximising the use of local chemicals 
and other resources, e.g. substituting chlorine gas with sodium hypochlorite produced in 
situ and substituting the sedimentation treatment stage with low-maintenance rough fil-
tration.26 These technical suggestions are largely superseded by the type of new generation 
compact units slowly being introduced; for example, the three DynaSand compact units 
installed at R-Zero are designed to deliver high capacity water treatment with low-energy 
and low-maintenance demands. None of the water managers and engineers interviewed 
for this policy brief expressed a concern related to access to chemicals (or energy). 
A greater threat to the operational autonomy of the water treatment plants is the issue 
of project delays from state funding and lengthy bureaucratic procedures. This was 
the principal concern at the two CWTU plants studied and research suggests that this 
problem is replicated in other water treatment plants. The biggest supply constraint to 
the two CWTU plants — shared by eight other CWTU plants sharing the same source — 
is that they are dependent on, and are limited by, the total water supplied by the Badaʿa 
Canal to R-Zero (no more than 30,000 m3/hr and sometimes less than 26,000 m3/hr). 
As the long-awaited conversion of the Badaʿa Canal to a closed channel would double 
this capacity (54,000 m3/hr), this single infrastructure measure would allow a major 
upscaling of CWTU treatment capacity.
25   Suhad Almuktar, Ahmed Naseh Ahmed Hamdan and Miklas Scholz, ‘Assessment of the Effluents of 
Basra City Main Water Treatment Plants for Drinking and Irrigation Purposes’, Water 12/12 (2020), DOI: 
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4441/12/12/3334.
26   Stefano Esposto, ‘Sustainability Applied to the Design of Water Treatment Plants in Iraq’, Sustainability 
Science 4/2 (2009), p. 293 –300, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-009-0075-3; Micangeli, Grego and 
Esposto, ‘Sustainable Rehabilitation of Water Infrastructures in Southern Iraq after the Second Gulf War’.
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4. A Mega-Infrastructure Future for Supplying Public Water?
In Basra Governorate, the growing role of CWTU plants in the treatment and supply of 
public water reflects repeated delays in realising a mega infrastructure solution to the water 
crisis. The public water network is a critical infrastructure vulnerable to cascading failures 
as a result of system-wide capacity deficits and interdependencies.27 Since the 1990s, most 
Basra city residents have bought private water for drinking, on account of regular interrup-
tions to supply and doubts over the quality of tap water. There are more than 30 private 
water treatment plants (using mainly reverse osmosis desalination) in the city which sell 
water through shops or directly from water tankers.28 
Figure 8: Private water tanker delivering water in Basra, November 2020
 
Photo: Azhar Al-Rubaie
At the same time, demand for domestic water in Basra city and Governorate is rising with 
rapid demographic growth (over 2 percent per annum), largely because of migration from 
other parts of Iraq. In this section, drawing on interviews with individuals responsible for, 
or contesting, water governance, we call for a regional move to system-wide resilience rather a 
mega infrastructure fix. Three necessary elements for this transition are: (1) supply diversifi-
cation; (2) multidirectional connectivity and (3) effective governance.
27   On the mapping of critical infrastructure failure see: Raghav Pant, Scott Thacker, Jim W. Hall, Stuart 
Barr, David Alderson and Scott Kelly, ‘Analysing the Risks of Failure of Interdependent Infrastructure 
Networks’ in J. Hall, M. Tran, A. Hickford and R. Nicholls (eds), The Future of National Infrastructure: A 
System-of-Systems Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781107588745.013.
28   In 2020, the price of one ton of water (1,018 litres) was 8,000–10,000 dinars (US $5.50–$6.80) from 
private water vendors in Basra city. Residents on low incomes are forced to use tap water.
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1. Supply Diversification
A sustainable public water infrastructure in Basra Governorate requires the diversifica-
tion of water supply sources to create system-wide robustness against negative long-term 
trends in surface water availability (e.g. from upstream damming and projected climate 
change effects) and disruptive short-term events (e.g. pumping failures or flooding). Con-
struction of the planned desalination plant at Al Faw would create a major supply asset 
in the regional public water infrastructure, but this could also generate a single-source 
dependency without investments in the wider network of water treatment and supply. 
These additional measures include timely completion of the donor-funded Great Basra 
Water Project and the Badaʿa Canal conversion, as well as upgrades in the operational 
efficiencies of CWTUs from the replacement and rehabilitation of units. Some interview-
ees raised the suggestion of greater secondary water storage to reduce the risk of supply 
shocks. The Badaʿa Canal has three storage basins that, in the event of a collapse in flows, 
can supply Basra city for an additional five days.29 This emergency storage capacity will 
need to be boosted for a converted canal doubling discharge rates.
Interviewees also claimed that there is substantial scope in Basra Governorate for waste-
water recycling for industrial, agricultural and household use. Oil companies withdraw 
large amounts of water from the Shatt al-Arab, injecting this into oil fields to boost extrac-
tion rates. As noted by an environmental scientist interviewed, modern techniques of 
water recycling for oil injection — as used, for example, by Exxon Mobil in the West 
Qurna Field west of Basra city — could greatly reduce these industrial demands on surface 
water.30 Biological treatment of sewage wastewater has potential to support agriculture in 
water-stressed agricultural areas:31 In the south of Basra Governorate, a lack of alternative 
water sources is driving many farmers to abandon agricultural livelihoods.32 Ecological 
treatment technologies can recycle wastewater for domestic as well as agricultural use. 
They can also contribute simultaneously to community regeneration and ecological resto-
ration. For example, the Eden in Iraq Wastewater Garden project has created a promising 
community template for water remediation in southern marshland environments.33
2. Multidirectional Connectivity
Public water infrastructure in Basra Governorate has a high degree of dependence on 
supply flows from sources originating outside the governorate. The northern districts of 
Al Quorna and Al Medaina withdraw water directly, from the Tigris and Euphrates respec-
tively. Most central and southern districts, including Basra city, have relied since the later 
29   Al-Mahmod, ‘Water Resources in Basra and its Recent Problems’, p. 88..
30   See also: Robin Mills and Mohammed Walji, ‘Muddy Waters: Iraq’s Water Injection Needs’, Iraq 
Energy Institute (2018). Available at https://iraqenergy.org/product/muddy-waters-iraqs-water-injec-
tion-needs-report/ (accessed 11 January 2021).
31   Muhsin A. J. Al-Mossawi, ‘Biological Approach to Recycling Waste Water in Iraq’, Air, Soil and Water 
Research 7 (2014), pp. 111–15, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4137%2FASWR.S17611.
32   ‘Iraq: Basra Fact Finding Mission Report #3’, Norwegian Refugee Council (2018). Available at https://
reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-basra-fact-finding-mission-report-3 (accessed 15 November 2020).
33   ‘Eden in Iraq Wastewater Garden Project’. Available at https://edeniniraq.com (accessed 21 
January 2021).
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1990s on raw water from the Badaʿa Canal and the Shatt al-Arab. Due to the very poor 
quality of water from the Shatt al-Arab, the limited and irregular flows of the Badaʿa Canal 
amplify a system-wide vulnerability to this single supply node. Interviewees in Basra 
argued that additional connectivity is necessary to build the resilience of the public water 
network. This would involve multidirectional supply connections from the south and 
north, supported by equitable transboundary flows:
• Southern supply connections: The large desalination plant planned at Al Faw will sig-
nificantly improve water supply connectivity in the south of Basra Governorate. This 
was recognised by several interviewees as potentially a major contribution to efforts to 
increase the availability of potable water. From the pumping station at Al Faw, a 340 km 
network comprising one trunk line and five branch lines will feed nine offtake stations 
(total storage capacity of 500,000 m3) connecting to exiting local distribution lines. 
Significantly, the planned Al Faw transmission system will remove the need for water 
plants located next to the Shatt al-Arab to withdraw water from this source.34 Two of the 
offtake stations are in Basra city and another is located in Al Zubayr, which would create 
system-wide redundancy (back-up capacity) alongside flows from the Badaʿa Canal.
• Northern supply connections: Water engineers interviewed highlighted the importance, 
if completed, of supply connections north of Basra city, notably JICA-funded rehabili-
tation of transmission and distribution networks associated with a planned new water 
treatment plant at Al Hartha (with a design capacity of 340,000 m3/day). This is a core, 
yet delayed, element of the Great Basra Water Project. It would move the main with-
drawal of water from the Shatt al-Arab for purification upstream from Basra city, with 
treatment benefitting from lower levels of organic pollution in the raw water.
• Equitable transboundary flows: Transboundary impacts on water availability in Basra 
Governorate were raised by research interviewees, though climatic stresses were men-
tioned more than upstream damming of the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun Rivers.35 An 
official from the Environmental Protection Department (Ministry of Health) highlighted 
dam-building in Turkey as a serious concern. Iraq has a 1990 bilateral agreement with 
Syria on sharing water from the Euphrates, but a 2009 memorandum of understanding 
with Turkey on water management has a narrow technical scope and there is no water 
sharing agreement with Iran. Since September 2020, Iraq’s Minister of Water Resources 
has led a delegation negotiating on transboundary water issues with neighbouring states. 
In March 2021, it was announced that Turkey had agreed to release fair water shares to 
Iraq.36 Syria and Iran should also cooperate in good faith with Iraq on the equitable and 
reasonable use of shared water resources consistent with international water law.
34   ‘Al Basrah Water Project’, ILF Consulting Engineers.
35   For an analysis noting a significant influence of climatic factors, see Mejs Hasan, Aaron Moody, Larry 
Benninger and Heloise Hedlund, ‘How War, Drought, and Dam Management Impact Water Supply in 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers’, Ambio 48/3 (2019), pp. 264–79, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-018-
1073-4.
36   ‘Iraq: Turkey Agrees to Release a Fair Share of Water to Our Lands’, RT Arabic, 14 March 2021. Avail-
able at https://arabic.rt.com/middle_east/1211357-العراق-تركيا-وافقت-على-إطالق-الحصة-المائية-العادلة-ألراضينا 
(accessed 16 March 2021).
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3. Effective Governance
Interviewees in Basra identified governance failings as the main reason for the ongoing 
water crisis, encompassing both shortfalls in governance authority and capacity. Most 
of the blame was attached to successive regional (provincial) governments, which have 
struggled to maintain peace and order. However, the political landscape in Basra mirrors 
the wider post-2003 political settlement in Iraq (the Muhassasa al-Ta ʾifia), which com-
prises a contested, often chaotic, distribution of state offices and resources between rival 
ethno-sectarian actors.37 Over the last decade, various Shiʿa Islamist parties and their mili-
tias have fought for control of public assets and contracts in Basra Governorate, with 
regular use of means of violence.38 The scope of formal rent-seeking rises and falls with oil 
prices, although extortionist practices are also a lucrative source of income, especially in 
the oil and gas sector. Public water projects are not immune from racketeering demands 
from tribal groups and sectarian militias, generating significant delays for initiatives 
designed to upgrade treatment and supply infrastructure.
Unconsolidated state authority is responsible for, and reinforces, widespread illegal extrac-
tion from public water networks, increasing operational costs and reducing water pressure. 
In research interviews, water engineers identified illegal tapping as a major contributor 
to the loss of water in public distribution networks. Largely ignored by administrative 
and judicial bodies, this illegal tapping encompasses individual households, businesses 
and large agricultural enterprises: it compounds risks to public health from water con-
tamination. However, illegal tapping is not simply an issue of the lack of enforcement of 
laws governing water usage; it also reveals the inequalities of water availability in Basra. 
Over 470,000 of the governorate’s population is not connected to piped water networks.39 
The illegal tapping of waterways and pipelines by residents of ‘unapproved housing’ 
(hawasim) often exposes these communities to untreated water, yet poorer households 
may not have ready access to potable water or be able to afford it from private vendors. 
A lack of government investment in the maintenance and extension of public water net-
works has aggravated the problem of affordable access to clean water. There is a need for 
an independent, impartial review of public water management in Basra Governorate to 
determine key challenges and to offer governance recommendations based on inclusive 
and open dialogue with affected communities.40
37   Toby Dodge and Renad Mansour, ‘Sectarianization and De-Sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq’s 
Political Field’, The Review of Faith & International Affairs 18/1 (2020), pp. 58–69, DOI: https://doi.org/10
.1080/15570274.2020.1729513.
38   Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘Basra’s Political Marketplace: Understanding Government 
Failure After the Protests’, IRIS Policy Brief (2019). Available at http://auis.edu.krd/iris/sites/default/
files/Saleem%20and%20Skelton%20-%20Basra%27s%20Political%20Marketplace_0.pdf (accessed 16 
January 2021).
39   Data from Basra Water Directorate, February 2021.
40   See, for example, ‘OECD Water Governance Indicator Framework’, OECD (2018). Available at https://
www.oecd.org/regional/OECD-Water-Governance-Indicator-Framework.pdf (accessed 17 March 2021).
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5. Conclusion
The public water network in Basra Governorate is a critical but neglected infrastructure. 
Crucial for the delivery of essential water services to the population, its deterioration over 
decades is a result of armed conflict, international sanctions and deficient governance. 
In Basra city, tap water has been undrinkable since the 1990s, forcing most households to 
rely on private water vendors. Water infrastructure upgrading was a priority for state-re-
building after the 2003 invasion but receded under the civil war. Governmental and donor 
plans for mega infrastructure water projects have stalled in the face of systemic corrup-
tion. CWTUs are the dominant treatment technology, supplying 83 percent of treatment 
capacity across Basra Governorate and 92 percent in Basra city. The efficiency of CWTUs 
supplying Basra city is restricted by irregular flows from the Badaʿa Canal to the key 
conduit of the R-Zero water treatment plant. These flows are impacted by upstream dam 
construction, climatic variability and illegal water tapping. The operational capacity of 
CWTUs is also limited by under-investment in their maintenance, often reducing their 
working life to 10–15 years. In the face of high population growth in southern Iraq, there is 
a pressing policy need to diversify water sources for Basra and improve the efficiencies of 
treatment technologies and distribution networks. A key lesson over recent decades for 
public water infrastructure is the need to avoid reliance on a single source of water.
Many of the water infrastructure failings identified in this policy brief are not unique to 
southern Iraq, but there are critical vulnerabilities compounded by the volatile political 
context. Before offering new grants or loans for major infrastructure projects, donors 
should support an independent review of public water management in Basra Governorate 
to determine the feasibility of effective and efficient assistance.
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